We use eye-tracking technique to test whether players' actions are consistent with their expectations of their opponent's behavior. Participants play a series of two-player 3 by 3 one shot games and state their beliefs about which actions they expect their counterpart to play (first-order beliefs) or about which actions their counterparts expect them to play (second-order beliefs). We perform a mixed model cluster analysis and classify participants into types according to both their attentional patterns of visual information acquisition and choices. Players classified as strategic (Level-2 players) and players classified as having other-regarding preferences like Inequity aversion and Prosociality exhibit patterns of visual attention and choices that are mainly consistent with their stated beliefs. Conversely, players classified as non-strategic (Level-1, Pessimistic, Optimistic and Competitive) do not best respond to any specific belief, but apply simple decision rules regardless of whether they are playing or stating their beliefs. Thus, using eye-tracking data we could identify a larger consistency between actions and stated beliefs compared with previous studies, and we could characterize the behavioral rules associated with choice-beliefs inconsistency. Implications for the theories of bounded rationality are discussed.
Introduction
In strategic interactions, optimal decisions depend on beliefs about the other players' decisions that in turn depend on their expectations about one's own decisions, and so on. Beliefs are crucial for many game-theoretic solution concepts and also for many behavioral models of game play.
Standard game theory assumes that agents best respond to their beliefs about other players' strategies (i.e. Nash equilibrium). In Quantal Response Equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey 1995) it is assumed that players have accurate beliefs about the behavior of the opponent 1 . In level-k (Crawford, 2003; Nagel, 1995; Wilson, 1994, 1995) and cognitive hierarchy models (Camerer et al., 2004) it is still assumed that players do best respond to their beliefs about others, even if they might use limited cognition in forming beliefs and they might have incorrect assumptions about the rationality of the other players 2 .
A common method used in experimental economics to study the level of consistency between action choices and beliefs consists of eliciting agents' beliefs about the other players'
actions. Belief elicitation procedures were applied in trust game experiments (Fehr et al., 2003; Bellemare and Krôger, 2007; Sapienza et al., 2013; Naef and Schupp, 2008) , in voluntary contributions games (Offerman et al., 1996 and Croson, 2000) , in an experimental lost wallet game (Duwfemberg and Gneezy, 2000) and in the context of information cascades (Hung and Dominitz 2004) .
It is generally accepted that in repeated games agents form a set of beliefs over time about the likely behavior of the counterpart and that the formation of these beliefs contributes to the equilibration process. However, experimental evidence clearly indicates that in games without clear precedents (one-shot games), agents exhibit action choices that are inconsistent with their stated beliefs. In this regard, Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2008) investigated the level of consistency between choice data and belief data using 3 by 3 matrix games 3 . They estimated players' beliefs from their choices in an "action choice" task, and compared them with those reported in a "state first-order beliefs" task. Analyzing game by game, they tested the hypothesis that the behavior in the two tasks was based on the same beliefs. However, participants best responded to their stated beliefs slightly more than 50% of the time (only 18% more than that predicted by random behavior) and the consistency hypothesis was rejected for most of the games. In a subsequent analysis, CostaGomes and Weizsäcker assumed the existence of five different types of players: Nash, Level-2, Level-1, Dominance-1 and Optimistic. Among these five models, the Level-1 model 4 described the action data best. However, when the players stated their first-order beliefs, they attributed their own level of sophistication to the other players. This behavior is inconsistent because if players believe their counterpart to be Level-1 they should best respond to this belief, acting like a Level-2 player 5 .
The authors explained this inconsistency by stating that there is a general and significant difference in the perception of the games and/or of how players' counterparts play games 6 .
A low level of consistency between choices and stated beliefs was found also by Nyarko and Schotter (2002) . In a series of two person constant sum game experiments, the authors tested the explanatory power of different belief-learning models and found that they do not predict stated beliefs well. Conversely, Ivanov (2006) and Rey Biel (2009) conducted experiments similar to that of Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker and found a higher level of consistency between action choices and stated beliefs. They also used 3x3 normal form games but their games were simpler than those of Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker. The difference in the results obtained by different investigators emphasizes the importance of the complexity of the environment and suggests that inconsistency between choices and beliefs increases with increasing complexity of the decision problem.
Another aspect to be taken into account when assessing the level of consistency between choices and beliefs is related to the existence of heterogeneity in interdependent preferences. A number of studies have reported a significant proportion of participants whose behavior is consistent with different motives such as Inequity Aversion, Prosociality and Competition (Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Fisman et al., 2007; Blanco et al., 2011; Iriberri and Rey-Biel, 2013; Polonio et al., 2015) . Heterogeneity in interdependent preferences requires defining the best response for each agent's belief based on her type. Therefore, to assess the level of consistency between choices and beliefs we need to define, with precision, the interdependent preferences of each agent, assuming that these preferences remain constant across the games the agent plays.
The aim of our study is to explain the general inconsistency observed in the literature between action choices and stated belief data. To reach this goal, we used both choice and eyetracking data (i.e. lookup patterns) to associate participants with different decision rules; then their stated beliefs about the actions of their counterpart and their stated beliefs about the stated beliefs of their counterpart (second-order beliefs) were predicted based on their type. The analysis of the eye movements allowed us to clearly distinguish between participants using different decision rules, and 4 Level-1 players best respond to a uniform probability belief over the actions of their counterpart. 5 Their results were shown to be independent to the order of the two tasks ("action choices" and "state beliefs"). 6 They also performed additional tests to exclude the possibility that inconsistency among choice data and belief data are due to risk-aversion or other-regarding preferences. Their results ruled out these hypotheses.
more importantly, to identify those types of players who make choices without forming beliefs about the expected action of their counterpart.
We started from the assumption that players' behavior is determined by decision rules or types that can be defined by the interaction between two general components: the motives that drive players' actions and the level of sophistication that can be reached by the players. Following this theoretical framework, we extended the Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker study in six ways. Firstly, we consider the possibility that players are guided by different motives when choosing their actions 7 . In this respect, we take into account a larger set of behavioral models that can be summarized as follows: (1 Thirdly, the information search analysis allowed us to evaluate differences and similarities between the visual information acquisition patterns used by the agents when choosing actions and stating their beliefs. Fourthly, we added (four) games with multiple equilibria to the set of games used by Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker, in order to evaluate possible differences in the decision process in a wider range of games. Fifthly, we added a treatment in which players have to guess what other players think they will choose ("state second-order beliefs task"). This treatment was introduced in order to better evaluate the hypothesis of level-k and cognitive hierarchy models regarding the belief based hierarchy of players 8 . Sixthly, at the end of the two tasks (action choices and belief statements tasks), participants were asked to complete questionnaires analyzing their cognitive abilities (Unsworth and Engle, 2007; Walsh and Betz, 1995; Frederick, 2005) , and their social value orientation (Van Lange and Liebrand, 1991; Murphy et al., 2011) , in order to assess possible correlations among variables related to strategic behavior (choices, belief statements and eyemovements) and different aspects related to cognition and personality traits.
We hypothesize that the level of consistency between choices and beliefs depends on the decision rule adopted by the participant. More precisely, we hypothesize that sophisticated players 7 It is important to notice that Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker included only individualistic types and a limited set of social motives in their analyses. The authors test whether the behavior of the players was driven by pure altruism (the willingness to choose the action that gives the counterpart the highest average payoff) or by Rawlsian preferences (the willingness to choose the action that maximize the lowest of the two players' payoffs), With our eye-tracking study, we identified the underlying reasoning processes adopted by different agents in action choices and stated beliefs tasks and we were able to distinguish between players who hold a clear set of beliefs about the other players' strategies and players who apply simple decision rules regardless of whether they are playing or stating their beliefs.
Experimental design

Games and models of game play
We selected eighteen games including the fourteen games used in Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker study plus four games with multiple equilibria. These games allowed us to distinguish among ten models of game play. The models were selected in order to have a large variability in terms of level of sophistication (Nash Equilibrium, , attitude (Pessimistic and Optimistic) and other-regarding preferences (Inequity aversion, Prosociality and
Competition)
9 , three dimensions which have proved to be important as determinants of behavior in interactive game playing. The ten models are summarized as follow:
1) Nash equilibrium model (EQ): players choosing according to the equilibrium.
2) Dominance-2 model ("D2", Costa-Gomes et al., 2001 ): players selecting a best response to a uniform prior over their partner's remaining decisions after applying two rounds of deleting dominated strategies.
3) Dominance-1 model ("D1", Costa-Gomes et al., 2001 ): players selecting a best response against a uniform probability distribution of belief over the opponent undominated actions only and zero otherwise. Level-2 model ("L2", Stahl and Wilson, 1994 , 1995 , Nagel, 1995 , and Costa-Gomes et al., 2001 ): players selecting a best response to level-1 players. 9 The models included the five models adopted in Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker study (Nash, Level-2, Dominance-1, Level-1 and Optimistic) plus another five models that allowed for the possibility that the agents have other-regarding preferences (Inequity Averse, Prosocial, Competitive) , are risk averse (Pessimistic) or perform two rounds of deleting dominated strategies (Dominance-2).
4)
5)
Level-1 or Naïve model ("L1", Stahl and Wilson, 1994 , 1995 , Costa-Gomes et al., 2001 ):
players selecting a best response against the uniform probability distribution of belief over the opponent's actions. 6) Pessimistic model ("Pess", Haruvy et al., 1999) : players selecting the option with the highest minimum payoff.
7)
Optimistic model ("Opt", Haruvy et al., 1999) : players selecting the option with the highest payoff. model ("IA", Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) : players selecting the option that minimizes the difference between their own payoff and the payoff of their counterpart.
8) Inequity Aversion
9)
Prosocial or cooperative model ("Pros", Van Lange, 2000, defined as altruistic in CostaGomes et al., 2001) : players selecting the option that maximizes the joint payoff.
10)
Competitive ("Comp", Van Lange, 2000) : players selecting the option that maximizes the difference between their own payoff and the payoff of their counterpart. In Table 1 , a description of the strategic structure of the eighteen games is given and the action predictions of the ten models of game play presented. Ten of our games are solvable in two, three or four steps of iterated dominance, four games have unique Nash equilibrium without dominant strategies and four games are weak-link games (a 3 by 3 version of the stag-hunt games) with three equilibria, one of which is Pareto optimal. Games with unique pure-strategy equilibrium do not contain salient payoffs. Conversely, weak-link games include possible game solutions that may act as attractors. As shown in Figure 1 , the games with unique pure-strategy equilibrium (games from 1 to 14) are organized into seven pairs of isomorphic games. The second game of each pair is identical to the first except for transposing the players' roles, changing the order of the three actions for the two players and adding or subtracting a constant small amount to the payoffs of each game.
Using pairs of isomorphic games all participants face the same sets of games regardless of the role they play (row or column). Importantly, participants cannot be aware of this because of the uniform payoffs shift. In coordination games, we do not need to have pairs of isomorphic games because each game has an isomorphic structure.
Overall structure
Our experimental design consisted of four treatments of two sessions each. The treatments were defined as follows: in treatment "A1T", players chose their action "A" (in all the 18 games) before stating their first-order beliefs "1". In treatment "A2T", players chose their action "A" (in all the 18 games) before stating their second-order beliefs "2". In treatment "1AT", players stated their firstorder beliefs "1" (in all the 18 games) before choosing their action "A". "T" indicates that eye movements were recorded in the three treatments. Finally, in treatment "A1" players chose their actions "A" (in all the 18 games) before stating their first-order beliefs "1" and eye-movements were not recorded. Treatment "A1" has been included in order to control for possible effects due to the eye-tracking apparatus. Participants were equally and randomly divided in row and column players within each treatment.
All sessions were run at the EPL lab (Experimental Psychology Laboratory) of the University of Trento. Participants were 130 undergraduate students at the University of Trento (42 males, 86 females), the mean age was 23 (SD 3.16). Presentation of the stimuli was performed using a custom made program implemented using the Matlab Psychophysical toolbox.
Before the experiments started, a copy of preliminary instructions, which described a 3 by 3 strategic game, was given to the participants and read aloud by the experimenter. The participants were required to pass a comprehension test in which they had to demonstrate that they knew how to map players' actions in a game to outcomes, and outcomes to players' payoffs.
Participants who failed the test were dismissed. Excluding these participants, we had 28, 28, 28 and 44 participants in treatments A1T, A2T, 1AT, A1 respectively.
Participants in treatments A1T first read the instructions about how to choose their actions and how they would be rewarded in the action choice task. After the eye-tracking system was calibrated, participants underwent two practice games, and then played the 18 games (session I). At the end of the first session, participants read the instructions on how to state their beliefs and how they would be rewarded for the accuracy of their statements. Next, they stated their first-order beliefs in all the 18 games 10 (session II) without knowing in advance the outcome of their actions.
No time limit was imposed on participants to give their response. At the end of the two sessions, participants were asked to complete questionnaires assessing their cognitive abilities, social value orientation and risk propensity (session III). We administered an immediate free recall working memory test (Unsworth and Engle, 2007) , the Wechsler digit span test for short-term memory (Walsh and Betz, 1995) , the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005) , and a social value orientation test (Murphy et al., 2011) . Participants were paid for their decisions in the social value orientation test.
In treatment A2T, the order of the tasks was the same but the instructions and the tasks in session II were about stating second-order beliefs. In treatment A1, the order was the same, except that we did not record eye-tracking data. In treatment 1AT, the order was reversed, and the participants stated all 18 first-order beliefs before they played the games. Participants first read the instructions about how to choose their actions and how they would be rewarded in the action choice task. Then, they read the instructions on first-order stated beliefs and how they would be rewarded for the accuracy of their statements. Next, they stated their beliefs for all 18 games and finally they played the 18 games.
Because of the peculiar characteristics of eye-tracking experiments, all participants were tested individually. At the beginning of the experiment, the experimenter told the participants that their responses would be paired with those of a randomly selected opponent belonging to the same experimental treatment 11 , and it was made clear that in each game they were facing the same opponent when playing the game and when stating their beliefs. No feedback about the result of their decisions was given to the participants until the end of the data collection. At the end of the data collection, participants were anonymously and randomly paired, and their responses were combined.
All participants returned to receive their payments a few days after the end of the experiment and everyone drew three tags from three different jars. Each of the tags in the first and second jars 10 Two practice trials were administered before beginning the state first-order belief task. 11 Except for players in treatment A2T which were paired with players in treatment A1T and vice-versa.
was associated with one of the games used during the experiment. The tag extracted from the first jar determined the payment for the action choice task and the tag extracted from the second jar determined the payment for the belief elicitation task. Each of the tags in the third jar was associated with a Social Value Orientation (SVO) slider item and the slider item extracted was used to determine the payments for the SVO questionnaire.
For the action choice task, participants were paid at a rate of 10 cents per point. For the first and second-order belief tasks participants were paid 5 Euro when their prediction was correct and 0 otherwise. For the SVO questionnaire, participants were paid 5 cents per point. They earned between 1.75 and 19.9 Euro in addition to 4 Euro show-up fee. 10 participants in the eye-tracking treatments were discarded due to poor calibration (see the eye-tracking procedure described in section 5.1) and 1 participant in treatment A1 was discarded due to technical reasons. We collected eye-tracking and behavioral data for 28, 19, 27 participants in treatments A1T, A2T, 1AT, respectively and behavioral data for 43 participants in treatment A1. The ethical committee of the University of Trento approved the study, and all participants gave informed consent prior to admission into the study.
Results: Choices and beliefs
Testing for treatment effects
As in Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2008) we evaluated possible treatment effects. We expected to replicate their findings, showing small differences due to the order of tasks and the players' role.
Furthermore, we expected no significant differences due to the use of the eye-tracking apparatus in action choices and stated beliefs.
We used Fisher's exact probability test to check whether the belief statement task has an effect on actions 12 . We paired the treatments (A1T, A2T, 1AT, A1) in all possible ways and compared the participants' aggregate actions separately for each of the 18 games. We found 4 pvalues lower than 5% (significance level), well within the limits of chance (10.8) for 216 comparisons (in A1T play vs. 1AT play in game 7, A1T play vs. A2T play in game 10, A1T play vs.
1AT play in game 11, and in 1AT play vs. A2T play in game 17). To control for possible learning effects in the absence of feedback, we tested the hypothesis that the actions of Row and Column players (within each treatment) in isomorphic or in pairs of isomorphic games were drawn from the same distribution. This hypothesis was rejected for only two comparisons (in A1T row play in game 2 vs. Column play in game 1, and in A2T row play in game 13 vs. Column play in game 11), which is within the limits of chance (3.6) for 72 comparisons. Based on these results we pooled the data of row and column players within each treatment and compared the players' actions across treatments again. We found only 3 comparisons with a p-value lower than 5%, which is within the limit of chance (5.4) for 108 comparisons (in A1T play vs. 1AT play in game 2, in 1AT play vs. AT2 play in game 10, AT2 play vs. A1 play in game 10). Overall, our results show that participants' aggregate actions are not affected by the order of the tasks or the usage of the eye-tracking device. The same analyses were repeated using the stated beliefs data. Once again, we found that the treatments have a non-significant effect on the aggregate belief statements.
Descriptive statistics for action choice data
We started our analysis on action data by evaluating possible differences in the percentage of equilibrium responses between our study and the one of Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2008) . In our study, equilibrium strategies in games with unique Nash equilibrium were chosen in 37.6% of cases (A1T=36.9%, A2T=33.2%, 1AT=40.1%, A1=38.3%), in Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker Nash equilibrium strategies were chosen in 36.3% of cases. The similarity in choice behavior between the two experiments is quite strong: in both cases, equilibrium strategies were chosen slightly more often than predicted by chance and this does not vary significantly among treatments. Table 2 shows the proportions of actions that are matched by each of the ten models listed in Table   1 13 . Similarly to the results obtained by Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker, Table 1 shows that the level-1 model on average describes the action data best. Participants chose the action predicted by this model 61% of the time. Competitive and Pessimistic models describe the action data almost as well as the level-1 model (59% and 57% respectively), but in games where the two models make different predictions, level-1 almost always describes the data better than the Competitive and Pessimistic models (see Table 2 ).
Descriptive statistics for belief statements
Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker used a scoring rule to determine the reward for the accuracy of belief statements. In their study, participants reported probability concerning the opponent's action, and were rewarded for its accuracy according to a quadratic scoring rule. Their method is quite informative, but because it requires a more complex response method, which may change the natural visual analysis used by participants to acquire information, we did not implement it. Since one of our priorities was to compare the patterns of visual analysis used by the players when they choose their actions and when they stated their beliefs, we kept the two tasks as 13 Data are pooled across the four treatments.
comparable as possible in terms of visual stimuli and type of response by asking the participants to indicate which actions they expected their counterpart to choose (treatments A1T and 1AT) or which action their counterpart expected them to choose (treatment A2T).
Equilibrium responses in games with unique-Nash equilibrium (from 1 to 14) were chosen 32.4% of the time in the first-order beliefs tasks (A1T=32.2%, 1AT=32.8%, A1=32.4%), and 29.7%
in the second-order beliefs tasks (A2T). Table 3 contains the proportion of stated first-order beliefs that are matched by each of the ten models listed in Table 1 , and shows that on average over the 18 games, belief statements follow the same pattern as action choices. As for the action data, the level-1 model describes the stated first-order belief data best among the ten models (0.70 on average) 14 .
The proportion of stated second-order beliefs that are matched by the ten models is reported in Table 4 . L1 is still the model that best explains the data but on average this model does not perform as well as in the first-order belief task (0.62 on average). In general, the explanatory power 14 Differing from what was found in the Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker study, the level-1 model performs better (9% difference) in the first-order belief statement task than in the action choices task. This is the only relevant difference between our results and those observed in Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker experiment, perhaps due to the different method used to elicit beliefs in the belief statement task.
of the ten models does not change across the three tasks (action choices, first-order and secondorder beliefs).
Level of consistency between actions and belief statements.
We tested the level of consistency between actions and belief statements at the individual level. In treatments A1T, 1AT and A1, we defined players' own consistency as the relative frequency of actions that are best responses to their first-order beliefs about the opponents' expected actions. In treatment A2T we defined players' own consistency as the relative frequency of actions that are best responses to what the players believe the opponent thinks they will do. Thus, we measured for each participant the proportion of actions being best responses to stated first (treatments A1T, 1AT and A1) and second (treatment A2T) order beliefs. Figure 2 shows the empirical absolute distribution According to Bhatt and Camerer (2005) and Goeree and Holt (2004) , comparing the correspondence between beliefs and choices as players reason further up the hierarchy from choices to first-order beliefs, and from first-order beliefs to second-order beliefs, we should observe less consistency. Therefore, second-order beliefs should be less consistent with choices than first-order beliefs. This reasoning however does not apply to our data (as in Bhatt and Camerer study 
Models of game play
The level one model appears to be the most widely adopted model by the participants during both game playing and stating beliefs. This shows inconsistency between choices and beliefs. A possible way to explain the current results while maintaining the assumption of consistency between choices and stated beliefs is to assume heterogeneity among individuals. We hypothesize that decision makers have different motives and different cognitive abilities, which determine their choices as well as their beliefs about other players' actions. As in Costa-Gomes et al. (2001), we assume that each agent's type is drawn from a common prior distribution of different types, with each type of player that remains constant across the games. We do not introduce ad-hoc models but consider ten models that have received some attention in explaining agents' behavior in game playing. The ten models correspond to those introduced in section 2.1 and were tested in terms of beliefs about the counterparts' decisions (first-order beliefs, "B1") and in term of players' beliefs about what other players think they will choose (second-order beliefs, "B2").
(i) Nash equilibrium model (EQ): In games with unique equilibrium, B1 is the counterpart's Nash equilibrium strategy and B2 is the player's Nash equilibrium strategy.
(ii) Dominance-2 model (D2): B1 is uniform over the opponent's undominated actions that survive after one iteration and equal to zero for dominated actions. B2 is uniform over the player's undominated actions.
(iii) Dominance-1 model (D1): B1 is uniform over the opponent's undominated actions and equal to zero for dominated actions. B2 is uniform over the player's actions. The rest of the paper will proceed as follows: in section 5.1 we perform eye-fixation analyses to test whether the type of treatment (A1T, A2T, 1AT) and the type of task (action choices, first-order beliefs and second-order beliefs) affect the way in which participants allocate their attention to the payoffs. In section 5.2 we define the expected Visual Information Acquisition patterns (VIA patterns) for the ten types of players in the action choice task. In section 5.3, we perform a mixed model cluster analysis and group participants according to the VIA patterns they use. In section 5.4 we assess the stability of the VIA patterns adopted. In section 5.5 we test, separately for each cluster, the action prediction of the 10 models. In section 5.6, we use action choices and VIA patterns to associate each participant with a decision rule. In section 5.7 we assess the VIA patterns adopted by different types of players when stating their first or second order beliefs. In section 5.8, we test the level of consistency between choices and beliefs based on the decision rule estimated. In section 6 we report the results of correlation test between variables related to strategic behavior (eye-movements and choices) and variables that capture cognitive and personality traits. Finally, in section 7 results are discussed in the context of theories of bounded rationality.
Eye-tracking data
Fixation analysis
For each of the 18 matrices, we defined 18 Areas Of Interest (AOIs) 15 . All of them have a circular shape ( Figure 3 ) and are centered on the payoffs. They cover less than 32% of the matrix area and never overlap each other. Moreover, none of them are adjacent to one another 16 . Fixation points that
were not located inside the AOIs were not considered in the analysis. Although a large part of the matrix was not included in any AOI, the large majority of fixations (87%) fell inside the AOIs. We recorded three different eye-tracking variables: (1) the total number of fixations made by the participant inside an AOI (fixation count), (2) the time spent looking within an AOI (fixation time), and (3) the number and type of saccades (defined as the eye movements from one AOI to the next).
Only fixations longer than 100 milliseconds were considered for the analysis, since this duration has been shown to be an accurate threshold to discriminate between fixations and other ocular activities (Manor and Gordon, 2003) . We used a Kruskal-Wallis test to evaluate possible effects of the three treatments (A1T, 1AT, A2T) on the proportion of own payoffs fixations (AOIs from 1 to 9) during the choice task. Results show that the level of attention given to own (or other player) payoffs do not differ across treatments (Kruskal-Wallis chi-square test = 0.442, p = 0.802).
Then, we used a Wilcoxon paired test to evaluate whether the order of the tasks (A1T, 1AT) affected the level of attention given to own (or other player) payoffs during the stated beliefs task. Again, the level of attention did not differ across the two treatments (Wilcoxon paired test, Z = 1.44, p = 0.149).
According to level-k and cognitive hierarchy models, when players states first-order beliefs they should use a lower level of sophistication compared to when they choose their actions.
Therefore, our expectation was that when stating their first-order beliefs they would remain more focused on the payoffs of the other player compared to the time they remain focused on their own payoffs when choosing their actions. To test this hypothesis we compared the proportion of time players spent looking at their own payoffs when choosing their actions with the proportion of time 15 Additional details about the eye-tracking procedure are given in the supplementary material (Appendix C). 16 In this way we avoid the possibility that small errors in gaze position measurements could result in an incorrect allocation of eye-tracking parameters located on the border of an AOI.
they spent looking at the other player's payoffs when stating their first-order beliefs in treatments A1T and 1AT. The data were analysed using a Wilcoxon signed rank test. Results show a statistically significant difference (Wilcoxon signed rank test, Z = 6.05, p < 0.001). We tested the same hypothesis for players in treatments A2T. However, no differences were found in the proportion of time players looked at their own payoffs when playing the games and when stating their second-order beliefs (Wilcoxon signed rank test, Z = 0.69, p = 0.245). 
Definition of the Visual Information acquisition patterns
Following Polonio et al. (2015), we defined the concept of Visual Information Acquisition pattern (VIA pattern) as the sequence of transitions (a transition is defined as the passage from fixation on one AOI to another) needed to extract information about the payoff structure of a game.
Considering all possible pairs of AOIs and assuming that each pair can be connected by transitions (one for each direction), the number of transitions that could be potentially observed equals 324, including transitions within the same AOI. However, our main objective when analyzing the transitions was to identify which VIA patterns players used to acquire information about the structure of the games when facing the 3 by 3 matrices. Therefore, we considered only those transitions useful to capture pieces of information that are necessary to: (1) Transitions that remain within the same AOI are excluded as well as transition that are not useful to detect dominance (e.g. from 1 to 5, or from 1 to 9 for a row player and from 10 to 14, or from 11 to 18 for a column player).
 Other within transitions (Other W): transitions from one AOI-other to another AOI-other,
within the same option of the payoff matrix (e.g., from 12 to 15, or from 12 to 18 for a row player or from 1 to 2, or from 1 to 3 for a column player). See From now on, we will refer to these five categories as relevant transitions. Then, we defined the general VIA patterns that should be used by the players depending on their types.
Cluster Analysis based on transitions
One of our objectives is to assign each participant to one of our models based on the combination between action choices and the information search pattern used during the action choice task. To reach this goal, we grouped participants in clusters based on their proportion of own within payoffs transitions, own between payoffs transitions, other within payoffs transitions, other between payoffs transitions and intra-cell transitions. To identify the clusters, we adopted a mixture models cluster analysis that has extensively been used in studies of game theory and process data (Brocas et al., 2014a; Devetag et al., 2015; Polonio et al., 2015) and proposed by Fraley and Raftery (2002) . The advantage of using this clustering method is that the number of clusters and the clustering criterion are not determined a priory, but they are optimized by the method itself. Mixture models consider each cluster like a component probability distribution; then a Bayesian statistical approach is used to choose between different numbers of clusters and different statistical methods (Fraley and Raftery, 2002; Fraley et al., 2012 ). We considered a maximum of nine clusters for up to ten different models, choosing the combination that maximizes the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). For our data, the BIC was maximized at 1328 by a diagonal model varying volume and shape yielding four clusters ( Figure 5 , Panels A-B). who focused entirely on their own payoffs using almost exclusively own within transitions. In cluster 3 (27 players) participants used mainly intracell transitions, which means that their analysis was focused on intracell comparisons of their own payoffs and those of their counterpart. Lastly, in cluster 4 (24 players), agents devoted considerable attention to the other player's payoffs.
Interestingly, they did not analyze their own and their partner's payoffs using own and other between transitions (necessary for detecting dominance); instead they used own and other within transitions (necessary for detecting the option with the highest average payoff or that with the highest minimum payoff). The VIA pattern used by agents in cluster 1 and 2 are in agreement with those expected for L1, Pessimistic and Optimistic players, whereas the VIA pattern used by agents in cluster 3 is consistent with that expected for Inequity Averse, Prosocial and Competitive players. Finally, agents in cluster 4 exhibited a VIA pattern that is roughly consistent with that expected for L2 players. findings showing heterogeneity in the VIA patterns used by the players (Brocas et al., 2014a; Devetag et al., 2015; Polonio et al., 2015) in interactive game playing.
To better understand the VIA pattern adopted by participants in cluster 4, we decided to perform an analysis of transitions over time. Specifically, we evaluated how the VIA pattern of players in cluster 4 changes in absolute terms and with respect to the average of all our agents. We decided to not use a fixed time span for our analysis, but to calibrate it on player's behavior. For each trial and for each participant, we computed the number of transitions needed to reach a decision and divided them in ten temporally ordered intervals. However, as shown in Figure 8 Panel B, at the time of decision (window 10), players in cluster 4 used a greater proportion of own between transitions with respect to the average of all agents. Taken together, the two temporal information search patterns are in accordance with what would be expected for Level-2 players. However, in order to best respond to a L1 player, the visual pattern of players in cluster 2 should be based on a specific subset of own between transitions. This subset includes transitions necessary to detect the best response to the expected action of a Level-1 opponent. To test this hypothesis we first determined (separately for each game) the Expected Action for a Level-1 opponent (from now on denoted as EA-L1). Then, we calculated the average number of own between transitions made by players in cluster 4 that are necessary to find a best response to the EA-L1 and compare it with the average number of own between transitions that are necessary to find a best response to the other two possible actions. As shown in Figure 9 , own between transitions that are necessary to best respond to the EA-L1 occurred more than twice as often as own between transitions that are necessary to find a best response to the other possible actions. Overall, our data support the hypothesis that players in cluster 4 are computing a best response to a L1 opponent. In parentheses, the average number of own between transitions made by players in cluster 4 (presented by the perspective of a row player) divided by expected and non-expected actions of a L1 opponent (presented by the perspective of a column player).
Stability of the VIA patterns.
We tested whether the VIA pattern of each cluster change when dealing with games with different strategic structures by comparing the proportion of relevant transitions for the four clusters in different types of games. We divided our 18 games in four categories: (1) games solvable in two steps of iterated dominance (games 1, 3, 5 and 7 for row players and games 2, 4, 6, and 8 for column players); (2) games solvable in three or four steps of iterated dominance (games 2, 4, 6, 8, 9
and 10 for row players and games 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 and 10 for column players); (3) games with unique Nash equilibrium without dominant strategies (games 11, 12, 13, 14) ; and (4) coordination (weaklink) games (games 15, 16, 17 and 18). Figure 10 shows that the distributions of the five types of transitions remained fixed within clusters, regardless of the type of game. These results are in agreement with the hypothesis that agents have a predetermined and stable way of acquire information which is invariant on the type of game (Devetag et al. 2015; Polonio et al. 2015) . 
Level of consistency between VIA patterns and choices
In Table 5 , we report the average proportion of actions that are matched by each of the ten models,
but differently from what we reported in Table 2 the models are tested separately for each cluster.
The Table shows some interesting results: L1 model (on average) describes the action data best only for clusters 1 (rate = 0.85) and 2 (rate = 0.83), while in cluster 3, data are equally explained by
Comp, Pros and L1 models (rate = 0.53, rate = 0.52 and rate = 0.52 respectively). In cluster 4 the model which explains the data best is the L2 model (rate = 0.72). These results support the hypothesis of a strong link between heterogeneity of the VIA patterns and heterogeneity of players' behavior. 
Analysis of decisions and information search
To associate each agent to a decision rule we used a procedural view similar to that of Costa-Gomes et al. (2001), assuming that each type of player defines (with error) her VIA pattern, and her type and search then jointly determines (again with error) her decision. More specifically, only those decision models which are compatible with the VIA pattern exhibited by the agent were considered as possible candidates. Then, each agent was associated with the decision model that best explains her action choices among the possible candidates.
Equilibrium decisions can be identified by checking directly for pure strategy equilibria or by best-response dynamics. To check directly for equilibrium (EQ model), own and other between transitions are required. In dominance solvable games, agents can also use iterated dominance or a combination of iterated dominance and equilibrium checking. In any case, for equilibrium detection own and other between transitions are required (Costa-Gomes et al., 2001; Devetag et al., 2015) .
Own and other between transitions are also required to check for dominated strategies (D2 and D1 models). However, none of our clusters exhibited a VIA pattern that includes a relevant proportion of own or other between transitions; therefore, none of our participants were associated to EQ, D2
and D1 players.
In order to best respond to L1 players, L2 players need to collect information about the payoffs of the counterpart (Costa-Gomes et al., 2001; Bhat and Camerer, 2005; Brocas et al., 2014a; Devetag et al., 2015; Polonio et al., 2015) . In particular, they need to use other within transitions to look for the strategy giving the counterpart the highest average payoff, or alternatively, other between transitions to look whether the other player has dominant strategies; then, before making a decision, they should perform own between transitions in correspondence with the expected action of the opponent to choose a best response to their beliefs. The VIA pattern exhibited by agents in cluster 4 is compatible with this model.
L1, Pess and
Opt models require the players to be focused on own payoffs. Therefore, players in clusters 1 and 2 can be alternatively associated to one of these three models (CostaGomes et al., 2001; Bhat and Camerer, 2005; Brocas et al., 2014a; Devetag et al., 2015; .
Inequity Averse, Prosocial and Competitive players need to perform intracell transitions in
order to compare own and other's payoffs for each possible decision combination (Costa-Gomes et al., 2001; Devetag et al., 2015; Polonio et al., 2015) . Therefore, players in cluster 3 can be alternatively associated to one of these three models.
To summarize, no agents were classified as EQ, D2 or D1 players. Agents in clusters 1 and 2 were classified as L1, Pessimistic or Optimistic players depending on the model that best explains their choices. Agents in clusters 3 were classified as Inequity Averse, Prosocial or Competitive players (again, depending on the model that best explains their choices). Finally, all agents in clusters 4 were classified as L2 players. Table 6 shows the number of agents (proportion in parentheses) assigned to the seven models (L2, L1, Pessimistic, Optimistic, Inequity Aversion, Prosocial and Competitive) and the average proportion of choices consistent with each model. 
VIA patterns for the seven models when stating first and second-order beliefs
In this session we test for possible differences between the expected and the observed VIA patterns used by the agents assigned to the 7 models (L2, L1, Pess, Opt, IA, Pros, Comp) , when stating first and second-order beliefs.
Players classified as L1, Pessimistic and Competitive, are predicted to believe that their counterpart would choose randomly, therefore they did not need to use a specific VIA pattern when stating first and second-order beliefs. The player classified as Optimistic 18 is predicted to believe that the opponent was altruistic and would choose the strategy corresponding to the player's maximum payoff, therefore it is expected that she/he would use own within and/or own between transitions (to identify her own maximum pay-off) regardless of whether she was stating her first or second-order beliefs. However, when stating their first-order beliefs L1, Pessimistic and Optimistic players used almost exclusively other within transitions as if they believed the other player was L1, Pessimistic or Optimistic (Figure 11 ). When stating their second-order beliefs L1 players 19 used almost exclusively own within transitions as if they believed the other player thought they were L1, Pessimistic or Optimistic (Figure 12 ). Similarly, Competitive players used mostly intracell transitions regardless of whether they were stating their first or second-order beliefs, as if they believed the other player was Competitive and believed the other player thought they were
Competitive.
The hypothesis that emerges from the analysis of these VIA patterns is that players classified as L1, Pessimistic, Optimistic and Competitive were using the same decision strategy regardless of the fact that they were playing or stating their first or second-order beliefs. In an attempt to explain this inconsistency we suggest that players classified as L1, Pessimistic, Optimistic and Competitive were not best responding to any specific belief, but applying simple decision rules which are based on an incomplete/imperfect model of the strategic situation at hand (Devetag et al., 2015) . In particular, they seemed to neglect the interactive component of the game, playing and stating their beliefs as if the two players were not involved in any strategic interaction. Players classified as L2 are predicted to believe that the other player would choose the action with the highest average payoff (L1 strategy) and to believe that the other player thought they would choose randomly (Level 0 strategy). Therefore, players classified as L2 should have used other within and/or other between transitions when stating their first-order beliefs. Conversely, they did not need to use a determined VIA pattern when stating their second-order beliefs. As shown in figure 11 , when stating first-order beliefs, L2 players used mostly other within transitions, as expected by the model prediction. However, when stating second-order beliefs they used mostly own within transitions as if they believed the other player was a L2 player. This evidence is in accordance with the hypothesis that they expected their counterpart to use a simple decision rule (e.g. choosing the option with the highest average payoffs) regardless of the fact that she was choosing her actions or stating her first-order beliefs.
Players classified as Inequity Averse and Prosocial are predicted to believe that their counterpart would be cooperative 20 and that they believe their counterpart thought they would be cooperative. Therefore, regardless of the fact that they were stating first or second-order beliefs, players classified as Inequity Averse and Prosocial should have used intracell transitions. Data in Figures 11 and 12 show that this prediction is confirmed.
To summarize, from the analyses of the VIA patterns we can make specific predictions about the expected behavior of the seven types of players when stating first and second-order beliefs: first, we expect that players classified as L1, Pessimistic, Optimistic and Competitive types used the same simple decision rules regardless of whether they were choosing their actions or stating their first or second-order beliefs. Second, we expect that players classified as L2 types believed that their counterpart would use a simple decision rule (L1 strategy) regardless of whether 20 Inequity Averse and Prosocial players carry out two different types of cooperative behavior (see session 4). Both types want to coordinate their choices with those of the counterpart but Inequity Averse players want to coordinate on the outcome that minimizes the difference between the payoffs of the two players and Prosocial players want to coordinate on the outcome that maximize the join payoff.
she was choosing her actions or stating her first-order beliefs. Third, we expect that players classified as Inequity Averse/Prosocial types believed their counterpart was Inequity Averse/Prosocial and thought their counterpart believed they were Inequity Averse/Prosocial.
Level of consistency between players' choices and their stated beliefs
In Table 7 , we show the proportion of first and second-order beliefs that are in accordance with the seven models divided by type classification.
Players classified as L2 should have believed that their opponents acted as L1 players; this prediction is satisfied 86% of the time. Accordingly, we found that players classified as L2 best responded to their first-order beliefs 71% (SD = 15%) of the time (well above the level of chance).
Then, based on the analysis of the VIA patterns, we assumed that L2 players expected their counterparts (L1 players) to use the same decision rule also when stating their first-order beliefs (i.e.
second-order beliefs). This hypothesis is confirmed by our data; in fact, players classified as L2
believed the other players thought they would have played as L1 79% of the time. It is interesting to note that L2 players believe that their counterpart applies a simple decision rule (chooses the action with the highest average payoff) regardless of the fact that they are choosing or stating their beliefs, which is exactly what they do.
Cognitive and personality traits
In this section, we report the results of correlation tests (Spearman) among variables related to strategic behavior (eye movements and choices) and a series of variables that should capture cognitive and personality traits likely to be relevant in the strategic task at hand.
After the experiment, participants were asked to complete questionnaires analyzing cognitive abilities, and personality traits. In particular, participants had to complete an immediate free recall working memory test (Unsworth and Engle, 2007) , a Wechsler digit span test for short memory (Walsh and Betz, 1995) , the cognitive reflection test (Frederick, 2005, CRT) , and the social value orientation test (Murphy et al., 2011, SVO) . Some interesting findings emerge from the correlation analysis: we found a correlation between the score on the cognitive reflection test and the proportion of choices in accordance with the L2 model (r = 0.31), and between the score on the cognitive reflection test and the proportion of other within (r = 0.29) and other between transitions (r = 0.46). The cognitive reflection test is a measure of the ability to control an innate and immediate wrong answer, executed with little deliberation, in favor of a right answer requiring a complex reasoning. A high score on this test is consistent with the behavior exhibited by L2 players 22 . The correlation between the score on the cognitive reflection test and the proportion of other within and other between transitions is well explained by the fact that the VIA pattern used by L2 players requires to observe the payoffs of the counterpart in a strategic way. We found also a negative correlation between the score on the working memory test and the proportion of choices in accordance with the Optimistic model (r = -0.37) and a positive correlation between the score on the working memory test and the proportion of choices in accordance with the D1 (r = 0.40) and D2 models (r = 0.30). We interpret these results as suggesting that players with a low working memory span use simple decision rules as choosing the strategy including the highest payoffs and players with high working memory span are more able to apply iterated deletion of other between (r = 0.52) and intracell transitions (r = 0.39) and a negative correlation between RT and own within transitions (r = -0.32), showing that applying a decision strategy that require a higher level of sophistication is time demanding. Table 8 reports the correlation coefficients (correlation coefficients in the shaded cells are significant at the 5 percent level).
Conclusions
In this paper we report an experiment in which 128 participants played and stated first or secondorder beliefs about their counterparts' actions in 18 one-shot matrix games. Eye-movements were recorded for 74 of them. The level of consistency between choices and beliefs is tested by assuming that participants can be one of several types, and each type may have a different underlying belief about the counterpart's strategy. We performed a mixed-model cluster analysis and classified participants according to their information search patterns. The cluster analysis clearly revealed 3 different patterns of visual analysis, according to which we categorized players into different types: one cluster of players was shown to focus prevalently on information regarding their own payoffs, and they chose accordingly with 3 simple non-strategic models (Level-1, Pessimistic and Optimistic). A second cluster contained players focused mainly on the comparison between their own and their counterpart payoffs. They chose accordingly with 3 models of social value orientation (Inequity averse, Prosocial and Competitive). The third cluster contained players that exhibited a more balanced mixture of all types of visual analysis, and they chose accordingly with a sophisticated model (Level-2).
Our results showed that participants have not played according to equilibrium, and neither they expected their counterpart to do so. However, the level of consistency between action choices and stated first and second order beliefs for players who were strategically sophisticated or players who aimed to coordinate their actions with those of their counterpart (Inequity averse and Prosocial) was always well above the level of chance. Conversely, non-strategic (Level-1, Pessimistic, Optimistic) and competitive players did not best respond to any specific belief, but applied simple decision rules regardless of whether they were playing or stating their beliefs.
We found that players categorized as level-2 exhibited a less sophisticated VIA pattern when stating their first and second order beliefs than when choosing their actions. We also found that Level-2 players believed that the opponent applied a simple decision rule (chose the action with the highest average payoff) regardless of whether she was choosing her actions or stating her beliefs.
Importantly, we found that this belief was consistent with the behavior exhibited by players classified as non-sophisticated (Level-1, Pessimistic and Optimistic).
Players classified as non-sophisticated (Level-1, Pessimistic and Optimistic) or Competitive exhibited the same VIA pattern and used the same decision rules regardless of whether they were choosing their actions or stating their first or second order beliefs. This is in accordance with the hypothesis that they were not best responding to any specific belief, but applied simple decision rules based on an incomplete/imperfect model of the strategic situation at hand. They seemed to neglect the interactive component of the game, playing and stating their beliefs as if the two players were not involved in any strategic interaction.
Assuming coordination on a mutually advantageous outcome as the objective of Inequity
Averse and Prosocial players, we found consistency between action choices and beliefs also for players having other-regarding preferences. The VIA pattern exhibited by players classified as Inequity Averse or Prosocial was characterized by intra-cell saccades between own and other player's payoffs regardless of whether they were choosing their actions or stating their first or second order beliefs.
Our results have important implications for non-equilibrium models such as level-k (Crawford, 2003; Nagel, 1995; Wilson, 1994, 1995) and Cognitive Hierarchy Models (CH, Camerer et al., 2004) . In a level k model, level-1 best responds to level-0, level-2 to level-1, and so on. CH model also has a recursive structure but in this case a level-k player best responds not only to level k-1 but to a mixture of lower-level types. According to these models, we found that level-2 players best respond to the belief that the opponent is level-1. However, our results show that level-1 players do not form beliefs at all. Instead, they apply a simple decision rule while attributing to the opponent their own decision strategy. Thus suggesting that strategic players (level-2 or higher) anchor their beliefs to an initial assessment of other's actions corresponding to a level-1 type instead of a level-0 type.
More generally, our study supports the hypothesis that players' behavior and stated beliefs, in one-shot games, are driven by two different types of mental processes: motivation and cognition, which determined different decision rules or types that remain constant over different games. Our classification based on the combination of eye-tracking and choice data allows us to accurately identify the decision rules adopted by the participants, and show an higher level of consistency between choices and stated beliefs compared with previous studies (Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker, 2008; Bhatt and Camerer, 2005) .
Finally, we found that part of the heterogeneity observed in players' behavior can be explained by differences in the ability to control intuitive responses in favor of reflective and deliberative actions and by the short-term memory capacity.
